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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
vs.

FRANK DELANO GAY, OLIVER
TOWNSEND & WILLIE OLEN
SCOTT,
Appellants.

Case No.
8565

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from convictions of robbery in the
Third Judicial District Court and sentences imposed
thereon.
Credit Industrial Loan Company in Salt Lake City,
was held up on November 28, 1955 and $465.00 was taken
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at gunpoint from the presence -of the assistant manager
and the cashier on duty (R. 95-98, 116-119). On December
3, 1955, a complaint was signed charging the appellants
with that robbery. The appellants Townsend and Scott
were arrested near Chandler, Oklahoma on December 4,
1955 and returned to Salt Lake City on or about the 22nd
day of December, 1955. The appellant Gay was arrested on
December 20, 1955 in Los Angeles and returned in January,
1956 to Salt Lake City. The three were bound over following preliminary hearings and charged in two informations
with robbery. After trial on April 10 and 11, 1956, they
were convicted as charged and sentenced to the statutory
prison term.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S BRIEF ABSENCE FROM
THE BENCH WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

POINT II.
INABILITY TO REMEMBER ACCURATELY
THE DATE OF AN OCCURRENCE IS NOT
PERJURY.

POINT III.
THE ALLEGED PRIVILEGED CONVERSATIONS WERE NOT PRIVILEGED.
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POINT IV.
THE REFERENCES TO MONEY FROM THE
MEMPHIS BOARD OF EDUCATION WERE
NOT ERRONEOUS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S BRIEF· ABSENCE FROM
THE BENCH WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
At page 75 of the record the following appears:
"THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, would you excuse me. I believe there is a man that is wanting
to see me and I will see if I can take care of it. You
may proceed."
The record then shows ten questions and answers running
onto the following page, at which point the Court admonished the witness to keep his voice up. From the amount
of testimony taken between the two statements by the
Court, it is certain that the Judge was gone not over two
minutes and it could have been any shorter period. During
that brief moment counsel for appellants were present and
the record reflects no irregularity in the proceedings. The
Judge did not lose control. of the trial. Consequently there
was no prejudice to the appellants resulting from his short
absence and they are therefore not entitled to reversal on
this ground. Section 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953; Tucker v.
State (Ark. 1937), 108 S. W. 2d 890.
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POINT II.
INABILITY TO REMEMBER ACCURATELY
THE DATE OF AN OCCURRENCE IS NOT
PERJURY.
Mr. Christensen was Assistant Manager of the victimized loan company. On direct examination he testified
that after the robbery, Detective Duncombe showed him, some
pictures of colored persons and that he identified the three
appellants as the stick-up men (R. 97). He was then asked
about two lineups held for identification purposes and he
obviously could not remember the correct date of the first
one. At R. 99 the record shows:
And subsequent to that time, Mr. Christensen, did you have occasion to observe a lineup?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

And when was that?
"A. That was a couple of days after the robbery. I don't remember the exact date.
"Q.

You don't remember the date?
"A. No. I believe it was about the second; no,
it couldn't have been the second, the second day
after. It w-as around the 18th or 20th. Well, it was
about two days after the robbery.
"Q.

Well, this occurred on the 28th, did it not?
"A. It was around the 30th, or something like
"Q.

that.
So that the lineup was after, two or three
more days after that?
"A. Yes, uh huh."
"Q.
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Mr. Christensen's confusion was not lost on defense
counsel. On cross-examination Mr. Hatch promptly took
up the matter of the first lineup and returned to it to exploit the witness's uncertainty as to the date (R. 101, 106).
Detective Duncombe testified that he showed pictures
to Mr. Christensen a few days after the holdup and that
Christensen picked the three appellants from the group (R.
129). He further stated that there were no lineups of living
persons until the afternoon of December 22, 1955, which
is about three weeks later than the date fixed by Christensen.
Whether Christensen confused the date of the lineup
with the date he saw the appellants' pictures, or just
couldn't remember, is immaterial. In either event such a
lapse of memory is normal. The accuracy of his recollection ran to his credibility, and that was a matter for the
jury's consideration. The appellants cannot complain on
appeal that the jury exercised its prerogative of judging
the credibility of a witness.
Appellants state in their brief that because of contradictory testimony of the witnesses in this case it is apparent that someone committed perjury. We agree with this
analysis ~nd submit that the jury by its verdict cast the
shadow of suspicion elsewhere than on the State's witnesses.

POINT III.
THE ALLEGED PRIVILEGED CONVERSATIONS WERE NOT PRIVILEGED.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

On January 28, 1956, priot: to trial of this case, the
District Attorney was served with a "Notice of Defense of
Alibi" (R. 11). Part of the Notice stated:
"That on the 28th day of November, 1955, they
were in the State of Oklahoma at the farm of the
grandparents of Willie Olen Scott immediately outside the town of Meeker, Oklahoma."
At the trial, on both direct and cross examination, appellant
Scott testified that on November 28, 1955, he was at his
mother's place (R. 175-178). The District Attorney asked
Scott whether he had given his atttorneys information about
his whereabouts on November 28, 1955, the date of the
robbery. Assuming that the substance of any conversations
with his attorneys on this point was privileged, the question
was sufficiently broad that it could have been answered
yes or no without infringing on the privilege. But the
subject matter of the question was not privileged because
it was not intended to be confidential. It was intended to
be communicated to the District Attorney as part of the
Notice of Defense of Alibi and to be advanced at the trial
as the foundation of the appellants' defense. Consequently
it comes within the rule that attorney-client communications
not intended by the client to be confidential are not privileged. 58 Am. J ur ., 'iVitnesses, Sec. 490 states in part:
"However, in order that the rule as to privileged
communications between attorney and client or its
reason shall apply, it is necessary that the communication by the client to the attorney or his clerk be
confidential, and be intended as confidential. The
communication must be made in confidence for the
purposes of the relation of attorney and client. If
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it appears by extraneous evidence, or from the nature of the transaction or communication, that confidence was not contemplated and that the communication was not regarded as confidential, then testimony of the attorney or client may be compelled."
The decisions in City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, (Calif. 1951), 231 P. 2d 26, 30; Brown v. St.
Paul City Railway Co., (Minn. 1954), 62 N. W. 2d 688, 700,
and Berkowitz v. Tyderko, Ltd., (Cal. App. 1936), 57 P.
2d 173 are to the same effect.

POINT IV.
THE REFERENCES TO MONEY FROM THE
MEMPHIS BOARD OF EDUCATION WERE
NOT ERRONEOUS.
The appellants' defense was that prior to, on the date
of, and subsequent to the robbery charged, they were in
Oklahoma and Tennessee. On cross examination the District Attorney asked appellant Scott whether, while in
Memphis, he had visited the Board of Education with Townsend (R. 193, 194). He answered in the negative. In cross
examining appellant Townsend, the District Attorney asked
whether some wrapped rolls of silver he had been carrying
had "Memphis Board of Education" on them (R. 229). He
answered that he had won the money gambling and didn't
know what it had on it. The District Attorney also asked
appellant Gay if he had visited the Board of Education
while in Memphis (R. 245). Defense counsel moved for a
mis-trial and the Court ruled that the question was imma-
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terial but denied the motion for mis-trial. The matter was
then dropped.
The purpose of these questions does not appear; the
District Attorney could have been searching for a weakness
in the testimony of the appellants which he was not able
to pursue. At any rate there is nothing in the questions
or in the answers elicited to prejudice the appellants in any
way and the same information was testified to without
objection by Mr. Hunter of the Oklahoma State Crime
Bu_reau (R. 252). There was no reference to another crime
as appellants argue in their brief, and anything of that
nature which might have been inferred by the jury would
have fallen far short of the affirmative statement of Mr.
Hunter, on cross examination by defense counsel, to the
effect that the appellants had been under surveillance and
had been suspected of certain burglaries prior to their
arrest for the offense charged (R. 260-262).
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CONCLUSION
The appellants have raised many points which we feel
are patently without merit and which consequently are not
discussed here. The questions they raise were questions
for the jury. The trouble is, the jury who observed the
appellants and their witness chose to disbelieve them and
believed instead the witnesses for the State. Having lost
the battle below by unanimous decision, they now seek a
re-match. This they are not entitled to. The judgment
below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
K. ROGER BEAN,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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